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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-ENFORCEMENT AND MODIFICATION OF PROSPEC-
TIVELY AND RETROACTIVELY MODIFIABLE FOREIGN ALIMONY DECREES
Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1955)
After several years of marriage to defendant-husband, plaintiff-
wife obtained in New Jersey a separate maintenance decree which
under New Jersey law was both retroactively and prospectively modi-
fiable. Thereafter, defendant obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada
based only upon constructive service. The Nevada decree contained
no provision with respect to alimony. Subsequent to the divorce, de-
fendant made no further payments of the sums due under the New
Jersey maintenance decree. He then moved to California where plain-
tiff brought suit to enforce the New Jersey decree. In reversing the
lower court's judgment for defendant, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia held that foreign alimony decrees are enforceable in California,
and can be modified by a California court to the same extent as by the
court which originally rendered the decree.,
A foreign decree2 which is subject to modification is not "final" and
generally need not be given full faith and credit.3 Foreign alimony
decrees, insofar as they require payment of past due installments, are
final and entitled to full faith and credit,4 provided that the court
which originally rendered the decree (F-1) had no power to modify
retroactively after the arrival of the maturity date for payment., To
1. Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1955). The court held that the
Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit insofar as it determined the
marital status of the parties, but that under Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948),
it would not be recognized to the extent that it attempted to adjudicate support
rights incidental to that status. Id. at 21. See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582, 588 (1858).
2. For the purpose of this comment, the term "foreign decree" refers to a
decree of a sister-state.
3. HARPER, TAINTOR, CARNAHAN & BROWN, CONFLICT OF LAws 832 (1950).
Several Justices of the Supreme Court, however, have expressed the view that
neither the full faith and credit clause nor its legislative implementation [62 STAT.
947 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1952)] requires that the decree be final. Justice
Jackson, an advocate of the extension of the full faith and credit clause, said in
his concurring opinion in Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 86-88 (1944), that full
faith and credit is to be given to all judicial proceedings. See also Justice
Rutledge's opinion in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 236-48 (1946) (dissenting
opinion) and that of Justice Frankfurter in New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey,
330 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1947) (concurring opinion).
4. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858). The Court treated the
past due installments, until recalled, as a debt of record and did not consider the
specific problem of finality. See also Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
5. Lynde v. .Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901), would appear to create an inference
that if accrued payments were ever modifiable, they are not final and therefore
are not entitled to full faith and credit. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910),
interprets the Lynde case to harmonize with the general rule laid down in the
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the extent that such decrees require future payments for support, how-
ever, they are not entitled to full faith and credit." The fact that the
court of the forum (F-2) is not bound to give full faith and credit to
a modifiable foreign decree, however, does not necessarily mean that
the court is bound not to enforce it.'
The numerical weight of judicial authority has viewed a foreign de-
cree as a "debt of record," the enforcement of which is limited to an
action at law for debt.? When an alimony decree of F-1 is sought to
be enforced in F-2, therefore, it is merely a debt of record which has
lost its special equitable characteristics. Thus, it is asserted, if the F-1
alimony decree is modifiable, it is not a debt of record and will there-
fore be denied enforcement at law in F-A0 Since the decree has lost
its equitable characteristics, plaintiff's concomitant equitable remedies
are consequently forfeit. Under this view, plaintiff is not permitted
to maintain an action for the enforcement of a modifiable foreign ali-
mony decree in F-2. The circuity of this reasoning is obvious. By
affixing the label "debt of record" to all foreign decrees, these courts,
by hypothesis, have denied enforcement of any modifiable foreign de-
cree, for alimony or otherwise, since a modifiable decree, by its very
nature, is not a debt "of record."'w Nevertheless, the majority of
courts have followed this line of reasoning." The modern trend, how-
ever, is toward recognition and enforcement. Courts which recog-
nize such decrees rely on various considerations, e.g., "comity,"12
Ba rc r case, N apra note 4, and holds that if the Payments have accrued and the
court which rendered the decree has not retained jurisdiction to modify retroac-
tively, then the judgment is final to the extent that the payments have accrued,
and ii. therefore entitled to full faith and credit
6. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1910).
7. See, .,q., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941)- Cum-
rings v. Cumnings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac. 245 (1929). See also Jacobs, The
Enforrc nu.nt of IForeign Decrees for Alimony, 6 LAw & CoNTra??. PRon 250,
263-64 (W39); Note, The Finetity of Judgments in the Conflict of Laws, 41
COL- , L. REv. 878 (1941).
8. See, .g., Worsley v. Worsley, 76 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Grant v. Grant,
75 F.2d 6(5 (D.C. Cir. 1935). See also Jacobs, spra note 7, at 268.
I. ' e& Jacobs, .'upra note 7, at 272.
I I. Cu et n v. Cureton, 132 Ga. 745, 65 S.E. 65 (1909) ; Paulin v. Paulin, 195Ill. App. W50 (1915); Lape v. Miller, 203 Ky. 742 263 S.W. 22 (1924); seeRESTATEMENT, CoxrF-cr or LAws § 464 (1934). For other cases, see 17 At.JUn., ftrec and Separation § 762 (1938) and (Supp. 1955); Annot., 157 A.L.R.
170 (1945); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1419 (1926).
12. In general, these courts state that they will recognize the decree on the
grounds of comity, but give no further explanation of the term. Sampsell v.Superior Court, 32 Cal, 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Sadder v. Sackler, 47 So.
d 292 (Fl. 1950); Cluhb v. Cluhb, 334 111. App. 599, 80 N.2d 94 '(1948);Sorenson v, Spence 15 5&D. 134, 272 N.W. 179 (1937); MeKeel v. Mcee, 185
Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 46 (1946). Contra, Cureton v. Gureton, 132 Ga. 745, 65 S.E.
65 (1909); Lape v. Miller, 203 Ky. 742, 263 S.W. 22 (1924); O'Loughlin v,
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"public policy,"' 3 and express 14 or implied statutory authority.'$ These
courts employ the same equitable methods of enforcement as are used
to enforce their own alimony decrees.'
The division of authority is more acute with reference to the ques-
tion of whether the court of the forum (F-2) has power to modify a
foreign alimony decree. 17  Many courts have refused outright to
modify. 8 Various reasons have been assigned for this position: (1)
O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 78 A.2d 64 (1951).
Some of the courts view the doctrine of comity as requiring reciprocity. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474, 13 S.E.2d 593 (1941). Other courts, how-
ever, make no such distinction. Pringle v. Gibson, 135 Me. 297, 195 Atl. 695(1937); Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 288, 88 A.2d 202 (1952), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 829 (1952). See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, comment a (1934)(Where the court of the forum enforces the foreign decree by reason of comity,
it applies its own law to the facts, which include the events and the foreign law.).
13. Thus, courts have stated that the husband will not be allowed to evade his
support obligations merely by crossing state lines. Kephart v. Kephart, 193
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 944 (1952); MeDufile v. Me-
Duffie, 155 Fla. 63, 19 So. 2d 511 (1944); Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill. App. 599, 80
N.E.2d 94 (1948); McKeel v. McKeel, 185 Va. 108, 37 S.E.2d 746 (1946). See
also Jacobs, supra note 7, at 265; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1949).
Also, it has been asserted that where the husband is subject to the jurisdiction
of the forum, to force parties to litigate in the court which rendered the decree
would cause great economic hardship to plaintiff with little corresponding benefit
to defendant. O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 6 N.J. 170, 78 A.2d 64 (1951). Addi-
tional "public policy" considerations cited include reduction of expense and delay
of relitigation in the court which rendered the decree and prevention of multiplic-
ity of litigation. Scoles, Enforcement of Foreign "Non-Final" Alimony ,and
Support Orders, 53 COLUmt. L. REv. 817 (1953).
14. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1913 (1953), Creager v. Superior Court,
126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P.2d 552 (1932).
15. In the principal case, for example, the court gave among other reasons, the
policy of the legislature as expressed by the UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT
OF SUPPORT ACT. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1650-90 (Supp. 1954). The act, which
has been enacted in forty-four states, [9A U.L.A. 68 (Supp. 1955) ], establishes a
two-state proceeding whereby the person to whom a duty of support is owed files a
simplified petition in the "initiating state." A copy is sent to a proper court of
the "responding state" which takes steps to secure jurisdiction of the husband or
his property, and which holds a hearing to determine whether a duty of support
exists. If such a duty does exist, the responding court may order the defendant
to furnish support. Payments made under such an order are then transmitted
to the initiating court, which receives and disburses such payments to the peti-
tioner. 9A U.L.A. 74-75 (Supp. 1955). In the principal case, the court asserted
that even though the parties did not litigate under the act, they would not be
required to go back and forth between the court of the forum and the court which
rendered the decree. As a matter of practical convenience the matter could be
as easily litigated in California as in New Jersey. 283 P.2d at 24.
16. See, e.g., Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942); Fanchier
v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 737, 114 So. 813 814 (1927); Guercia v. Guercia, 150
Tex. 418, 241 S.W.2d 297 (1951). Contra, Henderson v. Henderson, 86 Ga. App.
812, 72 S.E.2d 731 (1952).
Some courts rely on statutory grounds to equitably enforce foreign alimony
decrees. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 22, § 42 (1955), Clubb v. Clubb, 334 Ill. App. 599,
80 N.E.2d 94 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.24 (West 1945), Ostrander v.
Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N.W. 449 (1934). In general, see 27 C.J.S., Divorce
§ 328 (1941); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 652 (1937).
17. Annot., 134 A.L.R. 321 (1941).
18. See, e.g., Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal. 2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941) (ex-
pressly overruled by the principal case in this respect); Espeland v. Espeland,
111 Mont. 365, 109 P.2d 792 (1941).
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If defendant should travel from state to state, the various modifying
decrees which plaintiff might be required to obtain in each state would
result in "conflicts of authority" and "chaotic conditions."' 9 (2) So
long as F-1 does not modify its own decree, F-2, as a matter of judicial
courtesy, should treat the determination as being final and conclusive
and therefore entitled to enforcement without modification. 20 (3) The
proceeding in F-2 is not a suit for a new judgment, but is merely an
attempt to put an existing foreign decree in a different form so that it
may be locally enforced.21 (A respect for the judiciary of F-1 would
also appear to be the foundation of this last stated reason.) Some
courts which refuse to modify the foreign alimony decree will never-
theless hold the suit in abeyance until the party seeking modification
has an opportunity to litigate the question in F-1.2 2 At least one court,
while refusing to modify the decree directly, has accomplished the
same result through indirection by refusing to hold defendant for
contempt for any amount above that which it considers reasonable. 23
Recently, a few courts have permitted direct modification when
there has been a change in circumstances subsequent to the F-1 de-
cree. A Some jurisdictions distinguish between prospective and retro-
active modification,-5 and will modify the alimony decree with respect
to future support payments which have not yet accrued, but will deny
modification as to payments which have become due and payable. It
is submitted, however, that the principal case properly holds'0 that
where the foreign decree is retroactively modifiable in F-1, there is no
real reason why F-2 should refuse to hear a plea for modification.
Courts which do permit modification of foreign alimony decrees on
the basis of a change in circumstances, without differentiation between
prospective and retroactive modification, rely upon express statutory
authority,- "public policy" implied from statutes authorizing en-
19. Handschy v. Handschy, 32 Cal. App. 2d 504, 90 P.2d 123 (1939) ; Barns v.
Barns, 9 Cal. App. 2d 427, 50 P.2d 463 (1935); Little v. Little, 146 Misc. 231,
262 N.Y. Supp. 654 (Sup. Ct. 1932); Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 377, 56
N.E. 636, 637 (1900) (dictum).
20. Howland v. Stitzer, 231 N.C. 528, 58 S.E.2d 104 (1950).
21. Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N.W. 542 (1922).
22. Harrison v. Harrison, 214 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1954); Levine v. Levine, 95
Ore. 94, 187 Pac. 609 (1920).
23. Johnson v. Johnson, 196 S.C. 474, 13 S.E.2d 593 (1941).
24. See, e.g., Blauvelt v. Blauvelt, 199 Ark. 710, 136 S.W.2d 201 (1940); cf.
Schneider v. Schneider, 204 Misc. 918, 920, 125 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (Sup. Ct. 1953)
(dictum).
25, E.g., Coumans v. Albaugh, 36 N.J. Super. 308, 115 A.2d 641 (Juv. and
Dom. Rel. Ct. 1955).
26. 283 P.2d at 24.
27. The New Jersey statute, for example, provides:
Pending a suit for divorce ... brought in this State or elsewhere, or afterjudgment of divorce, whether obtained in this State or elsewhere, the court
may make such order touching the alimony of the wife ... as the circum-
stances of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable
and just . . .or enforce the performance of the said orders by such other
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1956/iss2/5
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forcement of such decrees,28 and upon analogy to child support and
custody cases, where modification is generally allowed.'
Although the court in the principal case was under no constitutional
obligation to recognize the modifiable New Jersey decree, it is sub-
mitted that the instant decision is based upon sound policy considera-
tions. It seems unnecessary, unreasonable, and unfair to require plain-
tiff to travel 3000 miles across the continent to New Jersey from time
to time in order to obtain judgments for specific sums so as to satisfy
an artificial "finality" requirement. A requirement that the parties
return to F-1 to relitigate the decree because of changes in circum-
stances places upon the parties additional time delays and increased
expenses, which could otherwise be easily obviated. By recognition
and enforcement of a foreign decree as such, F-2 is simply accomplish-
ing the same result as theoretically would have obtained in F-1 if suit
had been brought there.30 When F-2, instead of enforcing the foreign
decree as such, adopts the decree as its own,31 or when it takes the
view that its decree supersedes 32 the foreign one, the only binding
limitations are those which the court imposes upon itself. When a
party's claim of a change in circumstances seems on the merits to
justify a modification, and where the forum is one of convenience to
both parties, F-2 should recognize and modify a modifiable foreign
alimony decree.
EVIDENCE--CONCLUSIVENESS OF A PARTY'S OWN ADVERSE TESTIMONY
Snittjer Grain Co. v. Koch, 71 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1955)
Plaintiff brought an action for the purchase price of a corn drier,
alleging an oral contract of sale with defendant. While plaintiff's
direct evidence would ordinarily have been sufficient to take the case
to the jury,' he testified on cross-examination that he did not "sell"
the corn drier to defendant, but rather that defendant had "ordered"
lawful ways and means as is usual, and according to the source and practice
of the court; orders so made may be revised and altered by the court from
time to time as circumstances may require.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:50-37 (Supp. 1951), Robison v. Robison, 9 N.J. 288, 88 A.2d
202 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 829 (1952). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 65.15
(1941) Sackler v. Sackler, 47 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950)..
28. §ee note 14 supra.
29. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-15 (1947). See
also Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948); Lopez
v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953); Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 .E.
395 (1936) ; Turnage v. Tyler, 183 Miss. 318, 184 So. 52 (1938) ; Setzer v. Setzer,
251 Wis. 234, 29 N.W.2d 62 (1947).
30.. See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 273.
31. Palen v. Palen, 12 Cal. App. 2d 357, 55 P.2d 228 (1936); Creager v.
Superior Court, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 P.2d 552 (1932); Sackler v. Sackler, 47
So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1950). See Jacobs, supra note 7, at 266.
32. See, e.g., Durfee v. Durfee, 293 Mass. 472, 200 N.E. 395 (1936).:
1. Snittjer Grgii Co. v. Koch, 71 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Iowa 1955).
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